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Posts Tagged ‘market’

How Can You Tell Who Will Be a Good Investor?

In Uncategorized on December 22, 2011 at 3:06 pm

(image credit:  money.cnn.com)

We talked about what a great investor looks like, but how do we figure out who will be a good investor?  You gotta measure it to manage it, so do you look at how much money someone has made?  Their returns?  Or, more sophisticated, at an investor’s alpha or Sharpe Ratio?  These types of measures are the focus of fifty years of finance literature.  I can’t argue with their precision.  But if you care about future returns, we do know that they measure the wrong thing.

The traditional measures of investing prowess only measure the historical output.  In order to decide where to invest and create durable/improving investment performance you have to measure how the inputs make the outputs.  Just imagine sitting down with an investor for a year-end review and saying:  “Look you are doing OK, but we really need you to increase your returns in excess of the risk-free rate divided by the historical standard deviation of returns by at least 0.2 in the next year (Sharpe Ratio).”  Where would one even start with that?  It’s not actionable for an investor.  Like alpha, the Sharpe Ratio is a vanity metric – a figure that looks good for your end customers (limited partners), but has little to do with how to effectively deliver that product consistently to customers in the future.

If that wasn’t clear, consider another example, suppose GM exclusively measured their entire organization based on the finished vehicle.  In this case, vehicles would never get built because no one would know what to do.  To make the final product, you need to measure the performance of the various pieces of the production process in the ways that are under the control and are relevant to each part of the process.  People making seat covers need to be primarily measured on how many fault-free seat covers they can make per hour, rather than the JD Power rating of the entire vehicle.  If the interior, chassis, electronics, engine and assembly people are all executing well on their responsibilities, chances are they will make a great vehicle.  Not rocket science.

OK, so we don’t want to focus on the historical outputs, we want to measure how well the inputs are used, you get that.  What inputs should we measure then?  I will break them down one at a time, but to keep this short, I will give you the answer upfront and then show you how I got there.  The number one metric to measure is batting average.  Batting average, batting average, batting average.  In other words, the number of investments that an investor makes that are profitable divided by the total number of investments.  If an investor’s batting average over time is <50%, there are few ways to sustainably make money.  That is the breakpoint between success and a painful spiral.  A batting average <50% means that an investor will have to roll the dice for a few big winners and/or hope to allocate more capital to the winners than the losers.  It’s not sustainable or repeatable.

What is true about individual investors is true about investment organizations as well.  Obviously, if the aggregate investment organization’s batting average is <50%, they will need big winners or lucky capital allocation to perform.  But the batting average within the organization tells you even more.  If only a few partners have a batting average >50% or batting averages are declining among partners over time, that means that the partnership is sick.  If young analysts’ batting averages aren’t improving over time, that means the organization is not investing in training and/or recruiting.  In both cases, the great investment returns of the past are very unlikely to be repeated in the future even if the whole dollars, returns, alpha and Sharpe Ratio appear to be fine today.

It is clear that having a batting average >50% is at the core of making money investing, but is it an actionable metric?  Consider the year-end review to discuss a batting average:  “Look you are doing OK, but we really need you to increase your batting average from 40% to 60% next year.”  What do you do with that?  Well, go pick more stocks that go up than down.  What is the easiest way to do that?  Weed out the losers.  Do more of the winners.

In order to do that, you need to actually have data on when/where you win and lose.  I track my batting average by geography, market cap size, sector, industry and situation (IPO, spin-off, merger, etc…).  After a few years, an 80/20 emerges.  80% of my losses come from one particular type of investment .  So the actionable outcome is that I need to not trade those stocks or have the trading desk refuse to execute orders in those stocks.  In short, batting average is very actionable.

The readers of this post are smart, so I am sure a number of objections have started popping up in your heads.  Shouldn’t you measure batting average relative to the market?  Over what time frame should you measure the batting average?  Agreed.  So in an absolute return setting, a >50% batting average is what matters.  If you are long-only or benchmarked, then you gotta beat the batting average of the index.  If you are long-short, with certain exposure weightings, then you can benchmark against the index with those exposure weightings.  The same flexibility goes for timeframe.  If you care about performance over 3 years, then track batting average over 3 years, not year-to-year.  If you care about performance daily, then track the batting average every day.  A batting average is simple division, make it work for you.

Obviously, batting average does not = profits.  You gotta multiply the batting average times the exposure (the amount of money allocated to each investment) to get profits and we’ll go over measuring exposure in the next post.

View from the Bottom #23

In Uncategorized on October 20, 2011 at 3:17 am

(image credit:  labourlist.org)

I am sorry I didn’t write.  I haven’t been able to use my right hand for the last month.  The truth is the worst possible answer, carpal tunnel.  A hunting accident would at least provoke feminine pity and the hope to bridle something untamed.  Instead, it looks like I am fast with my figures, but slow on my feet.

Which brings me to Europe.  The Eurozone has been pushing out press releases at a desperate pace.  Week in, week out, we get rumors of the ECB buying Italian bonds.  The Chinese buying Italian bonds.  Germany and France buying something with 3 trillion dollars.  Hope, perhaps.  But this is like playing defense in your kid soccer league- watch the torso not the feet.  The torso is economic growth; everything else is the feet.  Without economic growth, Europe can’t meet its debt obligations and interest rates will stay high and smother hope.  The arguments for economic growth in an environment with declining wages are stretched.  So I don’t want to spend much time on Europe.  We covered it; we know what is going to happen for the next 6-12 months.  The only hard part is not getting distracted from the truth.

What is really interesting is China, and I wish I could have written more about it earlier.  Yes, the stock market is down over there, but there is more to come.  Let’s look at what has happened in China to understand what will happen.  China’s economy has been rapidly growing, particularly after executing the largest stimulus in the world in 2009 on a not quite so large economy.  In order to pull back the reins, China has tried to curtail loan growth at the banks.  Unlike other economies, China controls how many loans are made by banks.  It is actually the best way to control monetary policy.  Except, that if banks can’t lend, then other entities in the economy will meet demand and start lending.  So what has happened in the last three years is that thousands of large and small enterprises have started to lend money out for projects that official banks could not lend to.  In other words, the least qualified lenders have been lending to the most marginal borrowers.  How much have they lent over the last two years?  One or two trillion dollars.  Between us, that is a lot of money.  For a five trillion dollar economy, that is a lot of money.

But no one knows for sure how much money has been lent out through informal channels, which is what makes it so interesting.  For all the attention that the subprime crisis got, it wasn’t that interesting.  You could go on Bloomberg, see all the securitizations and the underlying collateral mortgage-by-mortgage, know what was going to happen to home prices, then know what the impact of falling home prices would be on consumption and then know the impact of consumption on GDP.  In China, we just have no idea.  Analysts are publishing many numbers about the informal lending sector, but there are no official figures.  We simply do not know how big the problem is and China is also lacking dozens of econometric studies exploring the effects of leverage on real estate prices, real estate prices on consumption, consumption on GDP, and on and on.  They’ve had private property for 10 years, total.

However, there are a few things we can know about China.  First, it is highly likely that informal lending is at least 10% of Chinese GDP, which would make it double subprime at the peak.  Unlike subprime mortgages, the informal loans are working capital or property development loans, which means they are short duration, highly cyclical  and need to be constantly refinanced.  This means that, if we have a problem, we’ll experience it quickly.  Like, over the next 12 months, not 3 years as was the case in the subprime crisis.  We also know that the collateral (inventories and incomplete construction projects) is worse than that of the subprime mortgage market.  We also know that the Chinese government is taking steps to prevent informal lenders from foreclosing on projects, which is good in the short-term, but it means that fewer new informal loans will be made.  This is bad because if a whole portion of the economy exists because informal loans can be refinanced, then a meaningful portion of the economy will be stripped of its oxygen supply, shortly.

So what we can conclude is: that the up-and-to-the-right-line that China’s growth has tracked has had some support from an exponential growth in lending.  The trips to Macau, the handbags and empty condominiums were made possible by artificial growth in leverage.  So the correct growth trajectory for China is not 8%, but some number of degrees lower.  If M2 (money), doesn’t grow at 30% anymore, but instead grows at 10%, does the Chinese economy continue to grow at 7-8%?  Maybe, anything can happen.  But not ever before has a sharp downward change in M2 been accompanied with constant economic growth.  Nevertheless, for the moment, China and its strategists are sticking to the 7-8%, with the caveat that all bets are off if the US and Europe go into recession.  Great, so we know all bets are off.

The implications of a low-growth Chinese economy with a negative interest rate environment over the coming decade will have to wait until next time.  Sorry to hold you in suspense.

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